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Entgegen der gängigen Annahme, dass das starke Militärregime Myanmars keinerlei gesell-
schaftliche Freiräume zulässt, argumentiert dieser Artikel, dass in drei Bereichen durchaus
Handlungsspielräume für zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure existieren: erstens im Rahmen von
Wandlungsprozessen innerhalb des Staates selbst, zweitens in verschiedenen Aufgaben-
bereichen des schwachen Wohlfahrtsstaates und drittens in einigen der ausgehandelten
Spielräume relativer ethnischer Autonomie in Waffenstillstandsgebieten.
Wenngleich diese Handlungsspielräume immer als relational zum authoritären Cha-
rakter des Militärregimes betrachtet werden müssen, so wird doch deutlich, dass zivilge-
sellschaftliche Akteure alle ihnen zur Verfügung stehenden Freiräume nutzen, um die
Notlage ihrer Gemeinschaften im Wohlfahrtsbereich zu lindern. Um zivilgesellschaftliche
Entwicklungen im authoritären Handlungskontext Myanmars zu erforschen, entwickelt
die Autorin erste Ansätze eines relationalen Verständnisses von Zivilgesellschaft und des
Handlungsspielraums, der dieser zur Verfügung steht.
Manuskript eingereicht am 20.12.2005, zur Veröffentlichung angenommen am 31.01.2006.
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1 Introduction
Since the Eastern European regimes collapsed, the concept of civil society has
become highly attractive to scholars, politicians and development practitioners
(Wischermann 2005: 205). Civil society was assumed to have played a crucial role
in the breakdown of those authoritarian regimes, which has led to a sometimes
uncritical euphoria about its meaning with respect to democratisation processes
(for examples see Rau 1991; Cohen/Arato 1997: 29-83). Many scholars have,
however, strongly rejected such assumptions about the democratic potential of
civil society, arguing instead that the precedent liberalisation of the respective
regimes had actually been much more important for both regime change and
the very possibility for civil society to emerge (Yang 2004: 8-10). Can civil
society emerge under authoritarian rule? If this is the case, what are the enabling
factors and what are the impediments for the emergence of civil society in an
authoritarian context?1 What kind of external support is needed and what is
counterproductive? With regard to these general questions, the case of Myanmar
reveals some interesting aspects. While it is often assumed that the strong military
regime of Myanmar does not allow for any room for manoeuvre, this article
argues that spaces for civil society actors do exist within three speciﬁc areas: ﬁrstly,
within the ambit of changes within the state itself; secondly, in various sectors of
the weak welfare state; and thirdly, within some of the negotiated spaces of relative
ethnic autonomy in ceaseﬁre areas. While these rooms for manoeuvre are always
relational to the authoritarian nature of the military regime, civil society actors
use every space available in order to tackle the welfare needs of their respective
communities.2
Since the military takeover in 1962, Myanmar has remained one of the world’s
most repressive regimes. A popular uprising led by the country’s students in 1988
was brutally suppressed and the military has tried to preserve its control ever
1 Another interesting question is how the speciﬁc character of the authoritarian regime – and indeed
of the state in general – inﬂuences the development of civil society and the way it is able to constitute
itself. So far, surprisingly little research has been conducted with regard to this matter. While this
article presents some preliminary ﬁndings, a systematic research into the question of what kind of
state causes what kind of civil society, is beyond its scope. Such a systematic investigation, which
is best dealt with by using a comparative approach, is, however, an important part of the author’s
future research agenda.
2 The observation that civil society actors in an authoritarian context use any space available in order
to promote the social interests of their communities has been made by Perinova with regard to civil
society developments in Myanmar, China and Vietnam (Perinova 2005: 27).
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since. Consequently, the results of the 1990 election, in which the opposition
party National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory, were
ignored. Research on civil society developments under such highly restrictive
circumstances requires a critical review of existing theoretical concepts. Used
in a normative sense, the concept of civil society often fails to explain social
developments in non-Western and authoritarian political contexts. In contrast,
this article focuses on the analytical dimension of the concept and develops primal
approaches to a relational understanding of civil society and the scope of action it
has. A relational approach accepts that the characteristics of an embryonic civil
society under authoritarian rule may differ from those of a mature civil society in
the context of a democratic constitutional state.
An analysis of both the constraints and the enabling factors for the develop-
ment of civil society in Myanmar is also fruitful for the international community
with regard to possible policy options. In this sense, the development of civil
society in Myanmar has to be discussed against the broader picture of the debate
on humanitarian aid for the country. Myanmar’s poor health and socio-economic
situation has long been an issue of international concern. For years it has been
assumed that about 40 per cent of the population live below the poverty line
(Steinberg 2001a: 46). Humanitarian emergencies like child malnutrition seem to
be steadily increasing (STI, 8.8.05). According to high estimates from UNAIDS,
the number of adult people infected with HIV/AIDS could already have reached
610,000, which would correspond to 2.2 per cent of the adult population (UN-
AIDS 2004: 2). While the humanitarian need for aid has been acknowledged in
principle, critics still argue that it does not reach the people and bring relief, but
rather strengthens the military regime and, therefore, inhibits political change
(ICG 2002a; ALTSEAN Burma 2002: 9; 31-52). The withdrawal of the UN
Global Fund from Myanmar has shown that the restrictions and xenophobia of
the regime often make it difﬁcult for UN organisations and international NGOs
to operate. If it was possible to identify local civil society actors in Myanmar, this
would help international donors, since those domestic groups could be engaged
as partners regarding the delivery and distribution of humanitarian aid. In this
sense, it is crucial to analyse what room for manoeuvre is available for civil society
actors and how this can be strengthened.
Unless otherwise indicated, the ﬁndings presented in this essay rest upon the
author’s research trip to Myanmar and Thailand in summer 2004. In some cases
sources of information have been made anonymous in order to protect the people
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interviewed. Due to the methodological difﬁculties resulting from the intricate
context of research and the lack of literature, the conclusions drawn here should
be considered as preliminary results inspiring further and more extensive research
and discussion.
2 Civil Society and Its Scope of Action under
Authoritarian Rule
With Myanmar being one of the longest-persisting military regimes in the world,
research into civil society developments under its tutelage requires a particularly
sound theoretical conceptualisation. This chapter seeks to deﬁne civil society and
its genesis in an authoritarian context and depicts theoretical approaches that can
be utilised to specify the scope of action available for civil society actors under
authoritarian rule.
2.1 Civil Society in Authoritarian Regimes: Towards a Relational
Understanding
Despite its continuing popularity, the concept of civil society is still a deeply
contested one (Wischermann 2005: 205). As Guan aptly says, “The concept has
descriptive as well as normative dimensions, and thus its usage is subject to intense
and endless debates“ (Guan 2004: 1). Conventional deﬁnitions of civil society have
laid emphasis on its normative dimensions deriving from democratic theory and
the values of the European Enlightenment. In this sense, civil society is closely
associated with a sphere which is autonomous from the state and the market. Civil
society associations are deﬁned as being characterised by voluntary participation,
tolerance, discursive procedures of decision-making and horizontal networks.
Correspondingly, they are assumed to generate mutual trust and democratic
values and to consequently promote democracy (for an overview and critique of
normative civil society theories see Edwards 2004). However, such deﬁnitions of
civil society have been criticised as stemming from Western philosophical history
and therefore as being inapplicable to other cultural contexts. They also tend to
be tautological, because a certain degree of democratisation can be considered as
both the consequence of and the reason for a vibrant civil society (Guan 2004: 8).
In order to describe civil society in Southeast Asia and its emergence under
authoritarian rule, it is more useful to emphasise the empirical analytical dimen-
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sions of the concept (Wischermann 2005: 203; Croissant/Lauth/et al. 2000: 10).
Used in an analytical way, any deﬁnition of civil society has to take into account
the speciﬁc scope of action it has. A relational approach seems a fruitful approach
to this endeavour,3 as it relates civil society to the political and cultural context
in which it operates. A relational approach thus takes into consideration the
scope of action available for – and conceded to – civil society actors. A demo-
cratic constitutional state is the condition sine qua non for an autonomous and
democratic civil society to ﬂourish. With the state apparatus of Myanmar being
heavily inﬁltrated by the military, it is obvious that this precondition is not met.
Instead, civil society emerges in the context of authoritarian rule, which has
profound consequences for the way it is able to constitute itself. Studies in civil
society developments in other authoritarian contexts provide valuable insights
in this regard. The cases of Vietnam and China have shown that in authoritarian
regimes that try to penetrate the social sphere, civil society organisations can
hardly achieve extensive autonomy of action (Heng 2004: 145ff.). In contrast,
civil society actors frequently have to maintain functional ties with members of
the ruling establishment – or even let themselves become partially co-opted by
the latter. Often, it is only this link that enables civil society actors operating in
authoritarian contexts to promote the autonomously deﬁned interests of their
respective communities (Yang 2004: 13f.; Perinova 2005: 6ff.; 28). Nevertheless,
the cases of Vietnam and China have also shown that penetration can be mutual
and that the evolving relations between civil society and the ruling establishment
are often multi-layered and complex in nature (Yang 2004: 3-14; Perinova 2005:
6ff.). Based on his analysis of the Vietnamese media, Russell Hiang-Khng Heng
has even suggested that under authoritarian rule, civil society might emerge from
within the state itself (Heng 2004: 157ff.). If this ﬁnding is reasonable, any analysis
of civil society in an authoritarian context should also focus on identifying the
speciﬁc sectors of the state from which it can emerge.
If one wishes to study the genesis of civil society under authoritarian rule,
deﬁning it as a sphere that is completely autonomous from the state and the
3 In developing my relational approach I was inspired by Gosewinkel, to whom I am deeply indebted.
The starting point – that civil society developments always have to be seen as relational to something
else – constitutes the common ground of our approaches. However, my own usage differs from
Gosewinkel’s in as much as I focus on the scope of action as the essential point of reference when
analysing civil society developments instead of using this only as a starting point for a new deﬁnition
of civil society action, with acknowledgement of difference being the central category, compare
Gosewinkel 2003 and 2005 and Gosewinkel/Rucht 2003.
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market therefore misses the point. Using a relational approach, by contrast,
the ascertainment of civil society actors always has to go hand in hand with
an analysis of the context they operate in and the scope of action which is
conceded to or gained by them. In this sense, it is more useful to deﬁne civil
society as a speciﬁc type of action and interaction. According to this deﬁnition,
which was developed by Kocka et al., civil society activities are characterised by
self-organisation and self-reliance, by their operating in the public sphere, by using
discourse as a means of resolving conﬂicts, by tolerance of heterogeneity and
pluralism, by their differing from violence and war and by their pursuit of the
collective good (Gosewinkel/Rucht/et al. 2003: 11).4 Deﬁned as such, civil society
is neither strictly conﬁned to any speciﬁc sector of society, nor will any real civic
organisation have all the ideal type characteristics of civil society depicted above.
The focus of analysis consequently shifts to research on the degree to which certain
organisations are more or less civil society-like.5 Likewise, this understanding of
civil society allows for an analysis of its dark sides (Lauth 2003: 22). A democratic
constitutional state is an essential precondition for a democratic civil society
to ﬂourish. Conversely, civil society seen in the context of authoritarianism is
likely to mirror features such as hierarchy and exclusiveness. Similarly, vertically
structured relationships as well as religious and ethnic cleavages in society as a
whole are bound to be found in civil society organisations as well (Croissant 2000:
360; Howell 1999: 17).
While the main characteristic of civil society organisations is the speciﬁc type
of action and interaction they practise, their degree of formality and their institu-
tional forms may differ considerably. In this sense, there are multiple examples of
civil society organisations such as advocacy groups, business associations, regis-
tered charities and developmental NGOs, but also informal community groups,
faith-based organisations and self-help groups (LSE 2004).6
4 My own translation.
5 Compare Gosewinkel 2003 and Wischermann 2005: 219-222. Both authors suggest focusing on the
degree to which certain organisations are more or less civil society-like. Their understanding of the
relational approach is different from mine, however; see footnote 3.
6 I have borrowed these examples from the London School of Economics’ own deﬁnition of civil
society, which does not explicitly refer to civil society as a speciﬁc type of action and interaction.
However, since the LSE deﬁnition is formal and descriptive rather than normative in character, this
is not a contradiction to the interaction-based deﬁnition applied in this essay.
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2.2 The Scope of Civil Society Action under Authoritarian Rule
Any analysis of the scope of action available to civil society actors has to take into
account both the constraints and the enabling factors that could potentially create
a suitable environment for civil society activities. Transition theory has acknowl-
edged that civil society can emerge under authoritarian rule (Croissant/Lauth/et
al. 2000: 21-30). It has also developed ideal type categories of regimes, but the
scope of action for civil society under authoritarian rule has not been extensively
conceptualised yet. Croissant, Lauth and Merkel consider the institutions and
structures of the authoritarian regime as important parameters for the genesis
of civil society. They have identiﬁed factors that deﬁne the degree to which the
political institutions of the authoritarian regime constitute a constraint for civil
society to emerge, such as regime coherence and regime durability, the extent to
which the authoritarian regime penetrates the society as well as the effectiveness
and strength of its corporatist arrangements and mechanisms of co-option (Crois-
sant 2000: 343-346; Croissant/Lauth/et al. 2000: 21ff.). This corresponds with the
proposition of the relational approach that civil society always has to be analysed
with regard to the political context in which it operates. The highly authoritarian
military regime of Myanmar, where a separation of power and an independent
judiciary do not exist, provides strong impediments for civil society, keeping its
radius of action tightly in check.
However, in contrast to totalitarian regimes, authoritarian regimes allow for
certain albeit limited space for civil society. Totalitarian regimes are characterised
by a combination of three dimensions. They have a monistic centre of power,
an exclusive and more or less elaborate ideology, which provides an ultimate
interpretation of social reality, and they actively mobilise the population through
a single party and the monopolistic groups deriving from it (Linz 2000: 70).
Thus, totalitarian regimes penetrate society to an extent that does not allow for
any kind of pluralism (ibid: 70; 263). Civil society, therefore, cannot exist in a
totalitarian context. The regime of Myanmar, however, is “bureaucratic-military
authoritarian“ rather than totalitarian in character.7
7 When deﬁning the authoritarian regime of Myanmar as “bureaucratic-military“, I am referring
to the typology used in Linz 2000: 184-202. The military regime of Myanmar has undoubtedly
incorporated both elements of organic statism and mobilisational practices, which will be depicted
below. However, this is not a contradiction to categorising it as “bureaucratic-military authoritarian“,
because authoritarian regimes usually combine elements from different regime types (ibid: 176-182).
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Moreover, Schneckener has rightly pointed out that regime stability should
not be confused with state stability, but that strong authoritarian regime features
and state weakness rather tend to be two sides of the same coin (Schneckener 2004:
12). The weak capacity of the state to perform some of its core functions opens up
spaces which can be occupied by civil society and other non-state actors. Modern
deﬁnitions of state attribute three core functions to it: ﬁrstly, to provide for the
security of the population and control the state’s territory; secondly, to provide
for the welfare of the population, which includes state activities in various sectors
such as the economy, labour, health, education and the environment; and thirdly,
to generate legitimacy, allow for popular participation and establish a democratic
constitutional state (Schneckener 2004: 12-14). If the state fails to perform these
functions, other actors can move into the gaps that exist. While Rotberg especially
refers to warlords and other criminal non-state actors (Rotberg 2004: 6ff.), Risse
also identiﬁes economic actors, NGOs, family clans and other local groups that
practise alternative forms of governance in sectors of state weakness or failure
(Risse 2005: 8-12). Some of these groups account for civil society actors in line
with the deﬁnition which forms the basis of this essay. These observations from
the research on weak states correspond with the ﬁnding of transition theory that
the failure of the state to perform its welfare function can be conducive to the
emergence of civil society under authoritarian rule. Local self-help groups can
advance to ﬁll the gaps, which exist in sectors of basic needs such as food, health,
education, development and environment protection. If they turn into functional
substitutes of the state, they sometimes manage to enlarge their political scope of
action as well (Croissant/Lauth/et al. 2000: 28f.).
It is noteworthy, however, that while state weakness can be conducive to
the emergence of civil society, it s also Janus-faced. As mentioned above, the
precondition for a strong – in the sense of independent and democratic – civil
society is a strong democratic constitutional state. Conversely, an authoritarian
state, which is only strong with regard to its military apparatus and its police
force but weak or failing with regard to its function to generate legitimacy, allow
for participation and establish a democratic constitutional state, seems to be
responsible for many weaknesses and dark sides of civil society.8 Furthermore,
it is debatable whether gaps in key areas of state responsibility such as welfare
8 Literature that focuses on a systematic research into the question of how much and what kind of
state is needed in order to generate a strong and democratic civil society is still rare or lacking,
however, compare footnote 1.
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are really due to state weakness or are rather the result of a deliberate strategy
of outsourcing (Zürcher 2005). However, when analysing civil society and its
emergence under authoritarian rule, this question is not of central importance.
What is crucial in this regard is that governance gaps do exist, whatever the reason
might be, and that they can be occupied by civil society actors.
3 Do Civil Society Actors Have Any Room for
Manoeuvre in Myanmar?
The “strong military regime – weak state“ phenomenon9 can be seen as lying at the
very roots of both the constraints and the enabling factors that could potentially
create a suitable environment for civil society in Myanmar. Given its durability
and repressiveness, there can hardly be any doubt that the military regime of
Myanmar is a strong one. Nevert heless, since the regime is not totalitarian, the
constraints it imposes on civil society action are not unlimited. Moreover, the
strength of the regime does not indicate that the state is strong as well.
“Instead, there is a need to separate the ability of the military regime to run an
effective state apparatus and its capability to stay in power.” (Rudland/Pedersen
2000: 2)
As Englehart has shown, the military has sometimes deliberately weakened
the bureaucracy in order to prevent it from counterbalancing the strength of
the army as an institution (Englehart 2005: 628). Recruitment of personnel on
the basis of loyalty rather than competence has led to a decline in bureaucratic
performance. Military control has been consolidated at the expense of the state’s
capability to perform its functions (Rudland/Pedersen 2000: 7-15). Rudland and
Pedersen do not use the “strong regime – weak state“ wordplay in a theoretically
embedded manner but only with regard to concrete features of the Myanmarese
military rule. However, both their ﬁndings and those of this article might provide
some concrete examples for the theoretical assumption of Schneckener that strong
regime and weak state are not mutually exclusive phenomena but rather two sides
of the same coin.10
9 In using the “strong military regime – weak state“ wordplay, I am referring to the publication by
Pedersen/Rudland/et al. 2000. I have modiﬁed this wordplay by categorising the regime explicitly
as a military regime.
10 Moreover, some of the ﬁndings of this case study might – in an inductive manner – provide food for
thought with regard to a systematic combination of state, regime and civil society theories.
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3.1 Limits of Regime Constraints
Institutions and Structures of the Authoritarian Regime
There can scarcely be any doubt that there are considerable structural imped-
iments hindering the emergence of civil society in Myanmar (Steinberg 1999;
Liddell 1999). The military regime has been in power for more than forty years.
Even though there appear to be internal power struggles, as the ouster of General
Khin Nyunt11 has shown, the economical power base of the military still seems
to be strong enough to prevent a split occurring within the ruling elite (Will
2004: 5). Thus, the durability and coherence of the regime seem to be formidable.
Since the crackdown on the popular demonstrations that took place in 1988, the
Tatmandaw12 has been expanded and modernised (ICG 2002b: 1-5). Figures are
hard to obtain, but it is supposed that its size has since doubled to between 400,000
and 500,000 soldiers (Selth 2001: 16). Intelligence capacities to spy on the popula-
tion have also been enhanced and modernised (Ball 1998: 91-125). With public
education facilities closed for long periods, a career in the armed forces is one
of the few ways to acquire education and skills. Afﬁliation with the Tatmandaw
also guarantees access to scarce consumer goods and public services (Selth 2001:
16). Most big companies either belong to the armed forces as an institution (Stein-
berg 2001a: 46) or are privately owned by military personnel (Mya Maung 1998:
65ff.). Together, these structural conditions lead to an enormous concentration of
political, social and economic power resources in the hands of the military.
Liddell has described the legal constraints on civil society in Myanmar by
saying there is “no room to move“ (Liddell 1999: 54); the state apparatus is
tightly controlled and inﬁltrated by the military. The development of free and
independent civil society associations is restricted by the lack of fundamental
civil liberties such as freedom of association, freedom of opinion, freedom of
expression and freedom of movement (ibid.). An independent judiciary does
not exist. Instead, the military rules the country with a combination of martial
law and restrictive decrees left over from Myanmar’s colonial past (ICFTU 2004:
168). It is, therefore, impossible to politically challenge the regime in a legal way
11 The former head of military intelligence, General Khin Nyunt, served as Prime Minister of the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC) from August 2003 to October 2004, when he was charged
with corruption and ousted in an internal coup. He introduced a seven-step Roadmap to Democracy
and experts and international policy-makers generally considered him to be a pragmatist.
12 Myanmar’s army (Selth 1995: 237).
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(ICG 2001: 6). According to the Unlawful Association Act, the Head of State can
declare any association unlawful without basing his decision on hard evidence and
can punish its members with up to ﬁve years of imprisonment (BLC 2004: 21f.).
Since Law 6/88 enacts that no organisation can be formed without the consent of
the Home Ministry, the Burma Lawyers’ Council considers it to be a deliberate
measure on the part of the regime to prevent the emergence of an independent
and critical civil society (ibid.: 22f.). The Press Scrutiny Board subjects all
publications to strict censorship (Liddell 1999: 59). The Computer Science
and Development Law makes the unauthorised possession of computers with
networking facilities punishable with sentences of up to seven years’ imprisonment
(ibid.: 61). To counter attempts at individual expression, the regime controls an
extensive propaganda machine including state-run newspapers and television
channels.
Consequently, the legal scope of action for civil society is very narrowly cir-
cumscribed and its legal ways of expression are extremely limited. Nevertheless,
some alternative channels of information and expression do exist. Even though
they have been declared illegal by the military regime, the BBC, CNN, Radio
Free Asia and the exile government’s Democratic Voice of Burma all broadcast to
Myanmar. Their programmes are transmitted on short-wave radio and are there-
fore quite easily accessible. Short-wave radios are imported from neighbouring
China and are relatively inexpensive. While such alternative information channels
do create enabling conditions for civil society actors, their impact remains limited
because many people fear repressions and punishment by the regime.
Mechanisms of the Military Regime with Which to Penetrate
Society
Partially due to political motives, exiled Myanmarese experts and members of the
Opposition have sometimes argued that their country was under totalitarian rule
(e.g. Mya Maung 1992). However, Myanmar’s military regime is authoritarian
rather than totalitarian in character and permits limited diversity regarding social
practices. The regime not only lacks a totalitarian ideology, but it also only partly
attempts to mobilise society through corporatist structures.
• Limited Diversiﬁctation of Social Practices
Even though the regime has promoted nationalism and militarism and tried
to exploit national security concerns in order to gain legitimacy (Steinberg
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2001b: 43-46), this should not be confused with a coherent and broadly
accepted ideology.
... neither the Ne Win regime (1962-1988) nor its SLORC/SPDC
successor resembles the nightmare regimes of Mao’s China or Pol Pot’s
Cambodia, where a revolutionary elite sought to transform society, de-
stroying traditional culture and ways of life and systematically eliminating
millions of "counter-revolutionaries. (Seekins 2005: 445)
While it is true that Christian and other religious minorities are often dis-
criminated against or even attacked by the military (ICG 2003: 21), the
regime does not totally deny citizens religious freedom, not even to minority
denominations. Christian churches are permitted to hold services and run
community programmes, which can especially be observed in Rangoon and
in ethnic minority areas. Members of the Muslim minority also conduct
welfare programmes in the capital. Furthermore, a certain variety of ethnic
and cultural customs persists and these are even displayed publicly. This
shows that the regime allows for limited diversiﬁcation of social practices
– but not for their transformation into political practices. Thus, military
penetration of Myanmarese society is not complete, and some gaps do exist
within the regime structure.
• Corporatist Structures and Co-optation
By creating Governmentally Organised NGOs (or GONGOs), the military
has tried to “strengthen its civilian support base and pre-empt the formation
of a genuine civil society“ (Rudland/Pedersen 2000: 4.). The Union Soli-
darity and Development Association (USDA) has developed a sophisticated
bureaucratic structure and its members are required to join government-or-
ganised rallies, some of which serve the purpose of intimidating political
opponents (Callahan 2000: 40). Other GONGOs such as the Myanmar
Maternal and Child Welfare Association and the Myanmar Red Cross are
active in service delivery and community development. Membership is often
forced on people by social and political pressure (Steinberg 2000: 115).
Ongoing attempts to co-opt Buddhism follow the same pattern of strength-
ening the civilian support base of the current regime.13 In 1990 the military
government established the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee as the
13 The vast majority of Myanmarese are Buddhists. Buddhism not only affects their daily lives, but
also to some extent the political decisions made by many citizens of Myanmar (Siemers 1993: 68ff.).
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supreme executive organ of the community of Buddhist monks (Sangha).
Nine Buddhist groups (Nikayas) were ofﬁcially recognised, while all the oth-
ers were declared illegal. The military has justiﬁed such measures by referring
to Myanmar’s pre-colonial monarchs and their alleged role as puriﬁers of the
Buddhist faith. On the other hand, Senior General Than Shwe and other
high-ranking military ofﬁcials frequently pay public visits to pagodas, and
the state media regularly propagates military donations to Buddhist institu-
tions and the state-sponsored construction of temples (Siemers 1993: 78-82;
Houtman 1999: 323f.). Nevertheless, the rather decentralised structure of the
Sangha still allows for some degree of independence, especially at the local
level (South 2004: 248f.).
In order to be able to receive international funding, civic organisations in
Myanmar are obliged to register with the government, mostly under the
Organisation of Association Law. However, registration always increases
the risk of an organisation being co-opted by the military regime, which
is what happened to the Myanmar Women’s Entrepreneurial Association
(MWEA), for example. When registering with the Ministry of Home Af-
fairs, it was pressured to invite General Khin Nyunt for an ofﬁcial founding
ceremony. Subsequently, members of the MWEA were asked to join the
government’s mass organisation, the Union Solidarity and Development As-
sociation (USDA) (Fink 2001: 134). It has since been considered as a co-opted
organisation. Co-option is a pervasive problem for civil society in Myanmar.
Even village self-help groups are often pressured to invite government ofﬁcials
to the inaugurating ceremonies of small infrastructure projects. However,
although the military regime tries to take the credit for civil society initiatives
in such a manner, the respective local communities mostly know how to
judge the situation properly. In this sense, co-option often constitutes the
lesser evil for civil society actors. Independent initiatives are often cracked
down on, even if they are presented as being purely apolitical (ICG 2001:
22). Nevertheless, the phenomenon of civil society emerging from within
the state itself and from within GONGOs suggests that co-option is not a
matter of one-way trafﬁc, but rather a double-edged sword since it can lead
to modest changes within the ruling system itself.
• Civil Society Emerging from within the State and Governmentally Organised
NGOs (GONGOs)
In authoritarian Myanmar, civil society is emerging from within sectors of
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the state itself and from within organisations which used to be under tight
state control. Certain retired ofﬁcials are frustrated with the regime’s policies
and the weak bureaucratic capacity of the state to perform its functions. It
is against this backdrop that the possibility of civil society emerging from
within the state itself has to be analysed. Some retired ofﬁcials have sought
alternative ways to organise and inﬂuence political developments. At the
same time, they still maintain good contacts with the military and the
bureaucracy. The longest-established and most outspoken of those groups is
the Veteran Political Colleagues. Made up of a number of surviving members
of Aung San’s Thirty Comrades,14 they have issued private and public letters
asking the regime to engage in dialogue with the NLD (ICG 2001: 23).
While this group seems to be heavily dependent on the military reputation
of its prominent members, it is far from the only one of its kind. Quite
a few retired civil servants are active in areas such as food security, health,
development and environment protection. While some of them found NGOs,
others engage in more informal ways often linked with religious charity.
The Alternative Development Association15 even declares it follows a par-
ticipatory approach to community development and capacity building. To
ensure sustainable development and food security, it educates local commu-
nities in agricultural techniques and resource management. It receives no
funding from the government, but is ﬁnancially and technically supported
by a big international NGO instead. Though registered as an independent
NGO, it still maintains functional ties with members of the administration
and conducts most of its projects in close co-operation with the government.
These strong linkages, which the organisation keeps with the state apparatus,
indicate that in Myanmar an ample grey zone exists between civil society
on the one hand and state and regime structures on the other. In this sense,
the founding of NGOs by former members of the administration can be
described as a case of civil society emerging from within the state itself. To
some extent they practise the speciﬁc type of action and interaction deﬁned
as characteristic for civil society. The emergent groups are distinguished by a
14 The Thirty Comrades, including Aung San and Ne Win, went to Japan for military training in
1941. When they returned to Myanmar, they recruited the Burma Independence Army (BIA) and
eventually led the country to independence.
15 Organisation known to the author; name changed for safety’s sake.
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certain degree of self-organisation and self-reliance, by their operating in the
public sphere and by their pursuit of a collective good.
Further activities of this kind include various forms of Buddhist charity.
Corruption is prevalent in the administration and public service institutions
like hospitals are often neglected. In private, however, government ofﬁcials
often engage in charity, because it is an essential part of their belief system.
The degree to which such charity is formalised varies from welfare institutions
such as hospitals at one end of the spectrum to much more informal customs
such as alms-giving at the other.
A similar pattern of civil society emerging from within the state itself is
visible in the emancipation of what were originally government-sponsored
groups. The regime has founded several Governmentally Organised NGOs
(GONGOs) and tries hard to tightly control them. Certain sub-groups
of welfare-orientated GONGOs or individuals within them do, however,
test the limits of state control. Some of them are genuinely interested in
delivering welfare services the best way possible, but see no other way of
doing so than by using government-sponsored channels. When welfare
projects cannot be carried out due to the constraints that the regime imposes
on political and social activities, these sub-groups or individuals within
GONGOs sometimes tacitly try to enlarge their scope of action to include
more politically relevant strategies. They might, for example, push for
better possibilities to communicate with international partners or tentatively
request a more open information system about diseases and natural disasters.
Their potential for emancipation has led the ICG to speculate that some
GONGOs could be democratised in the future (ICG 2001: 22).
While describing emancipating segments of GONGOs and welfare activities
conducted by government ofﬁcials as examples of civil society emerging from
within the state may be useful in analytical and political terms, it would be
misleading to perceive them as vehicles for early democratisation. It rather
appears that they are conservative and hierarchical in their organisational
structures and political cultures. A fruitful policy option for the international
community might be to conduct awareness training courses with selected sub-
groups of GONGOs and individuals within them. In the long run, this could
possibly produce changes in their political and organisational values (ibid.;
Purcell 1999: 86ff.). By contrast, only supporting GONGOs ﬁnancially,
as some donors have chosen to do, might not be the best alternative; this
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strategy risks strengthening existing power structures rather than achieving
piecemeal reform from within. Support in the form of awareness training
might be a good option for dealing with retired ofﬁcials’ NGOs as well. Since
they often keep up close links to the state apparatus, this could indirectly
help to encourage the desire for reform within the ruling establishment,
however task-orientated and apolitical they might be.16
3.2 Enabling Factors for Civil Society – Areas of State Weakness
As Will has said,
Despite the Burmese government’s attempts to act in a martial way
and curtail its citizens’ freedoms considerably, it is not or only on a limited
scale able to fulﬁl some of the fundamental tasks of a modern state, such as
guaranteeing a monopoly of power and a reliable legal system, or promoting
economic development and social welfare of its citizens. (Will 2004: 1)
The state of Myanmar can be considered as being particularly weak with
regard to the core function of providing for the welfare of the population.17
Furthermore, certain ethnic minority areas are not under the direct control of the
central state, which limits its territorial power monopoly. As a result, some room
for manoeuvre exists for civil society actors in the sector of welfare provision and
in certain territories with a degree of ethnic autonomy.
Undoubtedly, the gaps that exist in the welfare structure are not only due to
the weakness of the state bureaucracy; they are also part of a deliberate strategy on
the part of the regime, which is unwilling to change its funding priorities. While
the government performs poorly in the area of welfare provision, it channels
considerable ﬁnancial resources into its military budget. Since it lacks legitimacy
and popular support, military means of coercion are crucial for the regime to
keep itself in power. The gaps that exist in the welfare system are, nevertheless,
conducive to the emergence of civil society in Myanmar. Civil society actors
16 This comment on options for the international community to deal with civil society groups that are
close to the state apparatus does not aim at broadening the analytical framework of this article. The
author chose to include it, however, because it might beneﬁt those readers that are mainly interested
in policy options.
17 Regarding the categorisation of Myanmar as a weak state see e.g. Karetnikov 2004: 49; Ped-
ersen/Rudland/et al. 2000; Englehart 2005. Will categorises Myanmar as a “weak or failing
state“ (Will 2004).
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are able to move into the emerging spaces and take over central functions of the
welfare state.
Furthermore, it is not only due to the state’s territorial weakness that the
regime has negotiated areas of relative ethnic autonomy. In actual fact, economic
interests and deliberate strategies aimed at preserving the power position of the
military have often been much more important. Since 1989 the regime has
concluded ceaseﬁre arrangements with most of the armed ethnic resistance groups.
Many of the ceaseﬁres were motivated by economic interests in drug production
and resource extraction on both sides. Consequently they neither primarily reﬂect
the military or territorial weakness of the central state, nor a genuine desire for
peace and democracy. It is also important to bear in mind that the ceaseﬁre
arrangements are not peace treaties in themselves and that the ethnic resistance
armies have been able to retain their weapons (South 2004: 239). The military’s
refusal to negotiate with collective ethnic fronts can be considered a deliberate
strategy of divide and rule (South 2003). The political nature of the ceaseﬁres is
mostly complex and politically ambivalent.18 But even so, they still affect the
territorial power monopoly held by the central state because the ethnic groups
are granted some degree of administrative autonomy. Institutional and structural
regime constraints on civil society can hence be limited here.
Room for Manoeuvre for Civil Society in the Welfare Sector
The military regime in Myanmar tolerates certain civil society activities in areas
of tremendous welfare needs that the government is unable or unwilling to deal
with itself. Local self-help groups take over core functions of the welfare state and
try to satisfy basic needs regarding health issues, education and even the provision
of food. The emergence of such self-help groups in Myanmar seems to be a
rather new phenomenon, but their number is steadily increasing. Civil society
initiatives in the welfare sector vary in their degree of formality and organisation;
religious and welfare aims are often closely intertwined. At the local level, they
include traditional and unregistered village associations such as funeral societies
(South 2004: 247). Other civil society groups have established a more formal
18 In some cases it was only the arrangement of a ceaseﬁre that restored some degree of control over
what used to be areas of armed conﬂict or under the control of armed resistance parties to the
central government. In these cases the ethnic ceaseﬁre parties seem to have traded their demand
for independence in for an end of the ﬁghting and a degree of administrative autonomy that is
contractually guaranteed by the central government.
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organisational structure and are registered as NGOs, some of which have already
managed to extend their scope of action to the national level. Even though most
of these groups are exclusively active in the ﬁeld of service delivery, some have
managed to incorporate measures of capacity building and empowerment in their
projects. Subsequently, these NGOs not only provide for basic public goods such
as food and health-care facilities, but they also organise local communities into
project units and teach them the skills which are necessary for them to tackle
welfare issues on their own in the future.
• Community-based Organisations (CBOs) providing for Humanitarian
Self-help and local Infrastructure
Some local community groups have set up humanitarian self-help initia-
tives in sectors concerned with basic needs like food and health care. Other
self-help groups have conducted small infrastructure projects on a village level
such as the construction of wells. Such projects are mostly funded by dona-
tions from members of the respective local communities. Community-based
organisations (CBOs) are mostly issue-orientated and have an informal or-
ganisational structure. Many of them are unregistered organisations and are
therefore hard for international donors to identify. Furthermore, unregis-
tered initiatives often lack the skills to formulate project proposals and are
reluctant to establish close contacts with international organisations because
they fear repressions by the regime.
In the Buddhist communities of Myanmar it is often the local temples and
pagodas that provide the social space for communities to participate in
activities. Despite their religious purpose, they also serve important socio-e-
conomic functions and offer social security by providing local solidarity
groups with a legal space to organise. Some pagodas and temples maintain
rice associations and organise festivals, which also serve distributive functions
(Mutz/Ouan 2004: 6f.). Thus, these traditional and organic groups fulﬁl
important welfare tasks, which account for civil society activities in the
relational sense.
• Funeral Help Associations – Funeral Services for the Poor
A speciﬁc example of civil society action in the welfare sector is funeral help
associations. Working on the basis of private donations and the voluntary
commitment of their members, they organise and ﬁnance funerals for poor
people. This support is crucial for many needy families, since the expense of
a funeral would otherwise plunge them into even greater poverty and debt
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than what they already have to cope with. While some funeral societies grew
out of traditional village associations (South 2004: 247) and therefore tend
to have a rather informal organisational structure, others have registered as
NGOs and can even be found in large cities.
One such organisation, the Free Funeral Service Association, has even en-
joyed the support of famous local artists. According to Htain Linn, it is due
to the failure of the welfare state that Myanmar’s military regime tolerates
such relatively independent and well-known organisations: “Burma’s poverty
and economic uncertainty“, he recalls, “make an association like this indis-
pensable“ (Htain Linn 2003). In spite of their relative publicity, however, the
work of such welfare organisations is purely apolitical. If such organisations
become too well known and if their existence sheds too much public light on
the failure of the state, the regime sometimes pressurises welfare organisations
and tries hard to deprive them of their independence.
• Parent-teacher Associations (PTAs) Provide Basic Educational Facilities
Parent-teacher associations (PTAs) have been mushrooming in recent years.
In many towns and regions of Myanmar, these voluntary groups consisting
of parents and schoolteachers are the only actors to lay the foundations
for basic education. According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), more than a
third of the children in Myanmar leave school before even ﬁnishing the
ﬁfth grade (Parker 2005). Figures are hard to obtain, but it is thought that
the government spends no more than one per cent of its total budget on
education.19 Because the state often fails to provide even the most basic
educational facilities and materials, PTAs collect money for textbooks and
take care of the basic maintenance of school buildings. Some PTAs have even
managed to establish links to each other, thereby forming a network, which
indicates that their degree of organisation is increasing. Moreover, various
PTAs have contacts with international organisations that not only support
them ﬁnancially, but also make them familiar with modern approaches to
teaching and interactive learning. In this sense, PTAs perform a central role
in ﬁlling the gaps that exist in the sector of education due to state weakness.
19 For the ﬁnancial year 99/00 the International Monetary Fund assumed that the government spent
0.4% of the GDP on education (IMF 2001: 24). Referring to UNESCO ﬁgures, the Internationale
Konversionszentrum Bonn and the Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung (2005) assumed
that the educational budget accounted for 1.3% of the GDP.
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• The Sangha and Monastic Education
The education activities of the Sangha also play a prominent role in this ﬁeld.
Throughout the history of Myanmar, monastic education has been crucial as
a means of providing the country’s ordinary citizens with a basic education.
In some rural areas, in fact, monasteries are the only educational institutions
that exist (Brandon 1998: 235). Most monastic schools teach novices and
lay-children together. Unlike state-run schools, monastic education centres
are free of charge or charge less than the ofﬁcial fee at least. Some speciﬁcally
reach out to street children and orphans and also provide them with food and
accommodation. Most monastic schools are active in the ﬁeld of primary
education, but some also teach at a higher level and impart a number of skills.
Interestingly, they seem to be relatively free to follow their own curriculum as
long as they refrain from criticising the regime. However, monastic students
have to pass government exams in order to get an ofﬁcially recognised degree.
Many monastic education centres provide their services regardless of race and
religion, but education is certainly conducted in accordance with Buddhist
values and principles. Indeed, the main purpose of some Buddhist education
programmes is to counter similar efforts by the Christian churches and
prevent people converting from Buddhism to Christianity.
Monastic education centres vary both in size and in the degree to which
they are co-opted by the regime. Many rural Buddhist groups are localised
and centre around individual monks. While they are relatively independent,
their radius of action is necessarily limited to a few beneﬁciaries and their
education facilities and materials are often very basic. Even though they fulﬁl
fundamental welfare tasks, such informal initiatives are often invisible to
Western donors and consequently receive little or no foreign support (South
2004: 248f.)
By contrast, large monastic schools are often granted a surprisingly large
scope of action at ﬁrst glance. The Dhamma Buddhist Education Centre
in Rangoon,20 for example, runs its own medical and income-generating
facilities such as a tailor’s shop in order to make it self-sufﬁcient. It teaches
several foreign languages and is allowed to invite foreign teachers to volunteer.
Besides this, it maintains a library with a relatively rich collection of books.
Moreover, it has computer facilities and offers computer training courses
20 Organisation known to the author; the name and place have been changed for safety’s sake.
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for pupils and teachers alike. However, this room for manoeuvre is directly
dependent on the personal contacts that the presiding monk maintains with
several high-ranking ofﬁcials. While such personal linkages with the ruling
establishment compromise organisational independence, they also protect
the institution from repressions. Although the Dhamma Buddhist Educa-
tion Centre receives no ﬁnancial support from the state, military ofﬁcials
sometimes pay public visits in order to take some of the credit. In return,
the institution is granted considerable autonomy in running its programmes.
To sum up, in spite of co-option (or precisely because of it), the Buddhist
Sangha enjoys a measurable scope of action, which enables it to offer essential
educational services that the state fails to provide.
Similar education and welfare projects are performed by the Muslim, Hindu
and Christian minorities (especially by the latter). Since the Christian
churches are mostly active in the remote ethnic minority areas, where the
biggest part of the Christian population lives, their activities are discussed in
the following section.
Negotiated Room for Manoeuvre for Civil Society in Ceaseﬁre
Areas
While their political nature is often highly ambivalent, many experts and inter-
national aid workers agree that some of the ceaseﬁre agreements have led to the
emergence or enlargement of spaces for civil society (Smith 1999: 37-49; Purcell
1999: 89ff.; South 2004: 233). This scope of action for civil society actors de-
pends on at least two factors, however: ﬁrstly, the military strength of the ethnic
resistance party at the time of the ceaseﬁre agreement determines the degree of
autonomy that it is granted; and secondly, the political character and motivation
of the respective ethnic party are also crucial because not all minority groups
allow the emergent spaces of autonomy to be occupied by civil society actors
(Smith 1999: 38). While some ethnic minority parties administer their territories
in a highly hierarchical manner, others are more interested in the development
and political progress of their regions (ICG 2003: 13). Scopes of action for civil
society seem to have been enlarged in parts of Mon, Chin, Karen, Shan and
most notably in Kachin State (South 2003). Moreover, the emergence of civil
society spaces in minority areas also has to be seen in the broader context of the
enormous underdevelopment that these war-torn communities face and which
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the central government is unable or unwilling to address. However, while the
regime is unwilling to invest adequate amounts of money in the reconstruction of
ethnic areas, it might still be afraid that the armed resistance groups will call off
the ceaseﬁres due to economic frustration. This may be an important reason why
the military regime allows development projects to be conducted by civil society
actors, particularly in ethnic areas (ICG 2001: 23). The emergent spaces are ﬁlled
by civil society initiatives in the sectors of development, culture, education and
welfare and vary in their degree of formality and organisation.
• Informal Development Projects
At the local level, there are some informal initiatives and small NGOs that
focus on the basic developmental needs and reconstruction of war-torn local
communities. Mostly, these are issue-orientated and are highly decentralised.
The Development Support Programme in Mon State,21 for example, focuses
on informal education and capacity building. Its organisers train local beneﬁ-
ciaries in the analysis of social problems, in the writing of funding proposals
and in project management. The ﬁnal goal of this initiative is to promote the
emergence of new, self-supporting NGOs. According to its organisers, it is
unregistered, but it is still tolerated by the local authorities because it will
contribute to satisfy basic humanitarian and developmental needs in the long
term.
• Culture and Literature Committees and their Role in Education
In recent years, the regime has allowed various ethnic parties to issue publi-
cations in their local languages, which would have been unthinkable before
the ceaseﬁres. Following this increase in ethnic autonomy, civil society initia-
tives in the sectors of culture and literature have been mushrooming. This
emerging trend seems to be especially signiﬁcant in Shan State, where the
Shan Culture and Literature Committee plays a signiﬁcant role (ICG 2003:
18).
As South notes,
In recent years, the Chin, Karen, Mon PaO, Shan and other Culture
Committees have been among the few speciﬁcally ethnic organisations
tolerated by the government. As the education system has deteriorated,
such groups have pioneered alternative community education approaches.
(South 2004: 247)
21 Organisation known to the author; the name and place have been changed for safety’s sake.
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As early as the year 2000, 46,000 primary-school children in Mon State and
27,000 in Shan State were able to attend language courses in their own ethnic
tongues (Smith 2002: 26). The Mon Culture and Literature Committee has
conducted educational projects and produced publications in collaboration
with the Buddhist Sangha (ICG 2003: 18). While ethnic culture and literature
committees teach children and illiterate adults important spoken and written
language skills, they also bear the risk of being culturally divisive, thereby
reinforcing ethnic cleavages.
• Christian Churches and their Role in Education and Development
In predominantly Christian areas it is mostly the churches and church-related
organisations that help promote ethnic and local languages and address basic
social needs, which the central government is unable or unprepared to tackle
itself. To quote May Oo, who was a refugee in Karen State in the late 1980s
and therefore became a beneﬁciary of the welfare and education programmes
conducted by the Christian churches:22
There are several things the church organisations do. Certainly one is
to address the social needs in society; ... for example, the schools in remote
areas. Churches send teachers to volunteer in a community because the
government does not have a system and any kind of infrastructure does
not exist in those areas. Then communities will build the school on their
own and the teachers most of the time will be provided by the churches,
or even by the bible schools. ... And the same thing with health care
and health workers. So these fundamental needs like education, health
and food, most of the time in remote areas, will be addressed by the
church organisations, instead of the government having a programme
or a system. ... So if we look at Burma in that sense, then the role the
churches play is very signiﬁcant. (May Oo 2004)
In Christian communities the co-ordination between local associations and
INGOs has often worked well. Many Christian church leaders have contacts
to churches abroad and are therefore familiar with Western approaches to
development and welfare provision. Furthermore, a lot of local congregations
have a fairly sophisticated organisational structure, including youth and
women’s groups, which facilitates targeted implementation of communal
22 May Oo completed her Master of Laws degree in the United States. She is currently Director of
Communication of the Free Burma Coalition in Washington DC.
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projects (Smith 1999: 44). Christian educational institutions such as bible
schools seem to be relatively free to formulate their curriculum and set their
topics as long as they do not criticise the regime.
Myanmar’s Christian churches have even managed to establish national
network structures, such as the Myanmar Baptist Convention (MBC), the
Catholic Bishops’ Conference and the Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC)
(ICG 2003: 17).23 These umbrella associations run various developmental
programmes, some of which they describe as focusing on peace building and
women’s affairs. In addition to humanitarian aid and disaster relief, they also
conduct poppy crop substitution and HIV/AIDS programmes in remote
minority areas. Some of their educational programmes aim at ﬁnancing schol-
arships for gifted students to study abroad. Big church networks undoubtedly
have to keep up some contact with members of the ruling establishment in
order to be able to function. While this curtails their organisational inde-
pendence to a certain extent, it also guarantees them some protection and
autonomy in running their programmes.
The ICG links the scope of action conceded to the Christian churches
directly to the failure of the state to provide for the welfare of the ethnic
minority population in particular: “The regime likely tolerates Christian
projects particularly in ethnic minority areas, because they fulﬁl basic welfare
demands not met by the state“ (ICG 2003: 18). Furthermore, church leaders
have often acted as mediators in ceaseﬁre negotiations (ibid.: 17). As a
consequence, some of them have managed to negotiate an expansion of the
scope of action available for church-related organisations in the respective
ceaseﬁre areas.
• The Example of Kachin State
Kachin State is a good example of an ethnic area where the scope of action
available for civil society actors has increased as a result of the ceaseﬁre.
Since the nature of the ceaseﬁres is generally complex and multi-faceted, this
speciﬁc expansion of civil society space is also due to various factors. Firstly,
the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) was relatively strong from
a military point of view when it began its ceaseﬁre negotiations with the
regime. Secondly, it has shown some willingness to use the emerging scope of
autonomy to achieve developmental goals. A third factor that was crucial for
23 Accurate ﬁgures are difﬁcult to come by, but it is assumed that about two thirds of Myanmar’s
Christian population belong to various Protestant denominations and the other third are Catholic.
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the emergence of civil society space in Kachin was the role that the Kachin
Baptist Convention (KBC) and the Reverend Saboi Jum played in the ceaseﬁre
process. Acting as mediators, they were instrumental in brokering the KIO
ceaseﬁre with the regime (ICG 2003: 17). Today, the Metta Development
Foundation and the Shalom Foundation are active in Kachin State. These
two registered NGOs have become popular with international experts and
aid workers on account of their relative independence and community-based
approach to reconstructing their war-torn areas (e.g. South 2004: 247f.;
ICG 2001: 23; ICG 2003: 17; Perinova 2005: 14-25). Both organisations
grew out of the ceaseﬁre, with Saboi Jum playing a prominent role in their
establishment.
• Metta and its Role in Community Development
The Metta Development Foundation was set up in 1998 and has maintained
good relations with the KIO ever since (ICG 2001: 23). Metta is active in the
sectors of sustainable agriculture, food security, local health care, women’s
affairs and the reconstruction of local communities after decades of civil
war. As a matter of principle, it provides services regardless of ethnicity
and religion. Metta has achieved a lot in bringing humanitarian relief and
laying the foundations for sustainable development, but it has also managed
to incorporate community-building and capacity-building initiatives into
its projects. Programmes are organised in line with a grass-roots approach,
namely empowering local communities to conduct development projects
for themselves. To implement its projects, Metta organises the respective
communities into local development committees and later supports their
coalescence into self-reliant NGOs under the umbrella of Metta (Metta
website). Programme Director Daw Seng Raw has issued public statements
about Metta’s work, which provide evidence that the organisation is conceded
a certain degree of action by both the KIO and the regime. “We believe“,
she stated in her foreword to Metta’s 2004 Annual Report, “the concept of
community based projects lends itself readily to the creation of civil society
in Myanmar“ (Seng Raw 2004). Most importantly, Daw Seng Raw has called
for the international community to support reconciliation and development
initiatives in ceaseﬁre areas:
It is ... frustrating somewhat ... that no major government or
international agency has yet come forward to support such an initiative.
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... Rather it seems that certain sectors of the international community
have the ﬁxed idea that none of the country’s deep problems, including
ethnic minority issues can be addressed until there is an overarching
political solution based upon developments in Yangon. In contrast, the
ceaseﬁre groups believe ... that simply concentrating on the political
stalemate in Yangon and waiting for political settlements to come about –
however long it takes – is simply not sufﬁcient to bring about the scale
of changes that are needed. It ignores realities in areas long affected by
war on the ground. To revitalize these communities and bring about real
reform, health, social and economic development must run in tandem
with political progress. (Seng Raw 2001: 161f.)
• Shalom and its Role in Peace Building
In 2001 Saboi Jum founded the Shalom Foundation (ICG 2003: 17), an
organisation that is active in peace and conﬂict resolution and peace build-
ing between various ethnic groups, some of which used to ﬁght each other
militarily in the past. Its personnel are highly qualiﬁed and committed to
their work. Starting from Kachin State, it has managed to extend its pro-
grammes to other ethnic minority states as well. Shalom’s project approach
is participative and the Foundation uses traditional Christian and Buddhist
ideas on peace and mutual understanding in order to reach communities that
are unfamiliar with modern concepts of peace building more effectively. In a
country like Myanmar, which is divided along various ethnic and religious
lines, such a bottom-up approach to establishing mutual trust constitutes
an indispensable contribution to social development. Even though neither
Metta nor Shalom are countrywide institutions, they sometimes act as fa-
cilitators for longer-established associations (South 2004: 248) or for newly
emergent NGOs created under their auspices. While having to keep up func-
tional ties with the ruling establishment, they might also serve as protective
umbrellas for smaller and more independent NGOs within their radius of
action. Despite their size, neither of the two seems to have any political po-
tential; rather they steer clear of politics and carefully manage their relations
with the authorities in order to run their programmes as independently as
possible.24
24 The ICG has made this observation with regard to Metta (ICG 2001: 23). As my ﬁndings suggest,
however, it is directly comparable to the way the Shalom Foundation works as well.
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4 Conclusion
Civil society activities do exist in Myanmar and their room for manoeuvre can
be identiﬁed by using a relational approach. Theoretically the scope of action
available for civil society actors is best conceptualised from two angles. Firstly,
the regime is not totalitarian in character. Thus regime constraints on civil society
are not unlimited and some gaps within the regime structure do exist. Secondly,
the state apparatus of Myanmar is weak with regard to many of its core functions.
Spaces open up for civil society actors within such areas of state weakness. This
tendency is particularly relevant with regard to the failure of the country’s welfare
state. Indeed, this pattern seems to be the key factor enabling the existence and
emergence of civil society spaces in present-day Myanmar. It is also highly relevant
for the emergence of civil society spaces in underdeveloped and war-torn areas
with a degree of ethnic autonomy.
The case of Myanmar reveals some interesting aspects concerning the general
question of whether civil society can emerge under authoritarian rule and might,
therefore, be suggestive with regard to the broader theoretical discussion as well.
Firstly, the case of Myanmar provides strong evidence for the assumption of
transition theory that the failure of the state to provide for the basic welfare
needs of the population can be conducive to the emergence of civil society under
authoritarian rule. Secondly, civil society developments in Myanmar also back
the assumption made by Russell Hiang-Khng Heng that civil society can emerge
from within the state itself in authoritarian contexts, or at least from within
organisations that used to be under tight state control. By contrast, the pattern of
spaces opening up for civil society in ceaseﬁre areas under the control of ethnic
resistance parties might be quite unique to Myanmar, because from a historical
point of view the nature and structure of its ethnic conﬂicts are very speciﬁc. A
more general feature of these spaces for civil society, however, is that they are
negotiated. This pattern may not be conﬁned to Myanmar, but can probably be
found in other authoritarian contexts as well.
If civil society spaces are circumscribed and conditioned by an authoritarian
regime, what happens within them? What constitutes civil society under authori-
tarian rule? Regime constraints on civil society remain considerable in Myanmar.
The observation that social spaces exist should therefore not be misconstrued
as ascribing any political negotiating power to the emerging civil society organ-
isations, which they do not have. Instead, they are issue-orientated and mostly
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very localised. In order to be able to tackle the welfare needs of their respective
communities, civil society organisations in Myanmar are obliged to stay away
from politics and are consequently far from performing an advocacy role, a task
which is normally attributed to civil society in democratic contexts. While social
spaces are opening up due to state weakness, political space remains contracted
to an extent that does not allow for political expression or criticism. At the very
least, in order to ﬁnd a modus vivendi under the current regime, civil society
organisations in Myanmar have to keep up functional ties with members of the
ruling establishment or even let themselves become partially co-opted by the
latter, which often gives them a double identity. This case study has shown that
co-option can be a double-edged sword, however. In Myanmar the patterns of
co-option are multi-layered and complex, a fact that not only deprives civil society
of its independence; it can also contribute to modest changes taking place within
the ruling establishment itself.
Nevertheless, the prerequisite for a healthy and independent civil society –
one that adheres to democratic norms such as ﬂat hierarchies, pluralistic tolerance
and dialogue – is the existence of a democratic constitutional state. As this
prerequisite has not been fulﬁlled in the authoritarian context of Myanmar, civil
society has taken on a different form and mirrors many of the dark sides of the
context of action it is operating in. For example, civil society groups in Myanmar
are sometimes exclusive bodies, with membership and beneﬁts conﬁned to a
speciﬁc ethnic or religious group. Furthermore, their internal structure is often
hierarchical, they don’t favour active participation by their members with respect
to decision making, and they sometimes lack transparency.
With Myanmar’s civil society being at such an embryonic stage, it would be
utopian to consider it a vehicle for early democratisation. Nevertheless, civil soci-
ety groups help to sustain basic welfare structures and human resources. Moreover,
in spite of their dark sides, they practise a mode of action and interaction that dif-
fers from military patterns of command and coercion. Civil society developments
in Myanmar could therefore be at the very roots of a gradual transformation of
social structures and patterns of behaviour. In the long run, this could contribute
to a widening of political space as well.
With the current regime being as strong as it is and the prospects for an
early transition bleak, the international community should start thinking about
alternative ways of promoting social change in Myanmar and of helping its
suffering population. While in the long term the necessity to achieve regime
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change continues to be important, international donors should now concentrate
on an analysis of what spaces are available for civil society actors and how they
can be strengthened. Identifying local partners, channelling humanitarian aid into
local community development projects and detecting reform-orientated groups
with roots in the state apparatus are all ways that have not been fully explored as
yet.
References
ALTSEAN Burma (2002), A Peace of Pie? Burma’s Humanitarian Aid Debate, Special
Report, Bangkok: ALTSEAN Burma
Ball, Desmond (1998), Burma’s Military Secrets. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from 1941 to
Cyber Warfare, Bangkok: White Lotus
Brandon, John J. (1998), “The State’s Role in Education in Burma. An Overview“, in:
Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (1998), Burma. Prospects for a Democratic Future, The World
Peace Foundation and Harvard Institute for International Development, Washington
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 233-245
Burma Lawyers’ Council (BLC) (2004), “A Brief Analysis on the Judiciary of Burma“, in:
Legal Issues on Burma Journal, No. 18, pp. 2-32
Callahan, Mary P. (2000), “Cracks in the Ediﬁce? Changes in the Military-Society Relations
in Burma since 1988“, in: Pedersen, Morten B./Rudland, Emily/May, Ronald J. (eds.)
(2000), Burma Myanmar. Strong Regime Weak State?, Adelaide: Crawford House
Publishing, pp. 22-51
Cohen, Jean L./Arato, Andrew (1997), Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge,
Mass./London: MIT Press, fourth printing
Croissant, Aurel (2000), “Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation in Ostasien“, in: Merkel,
Wolfgang (ed.) (2000), Systemwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation, Opladen:
Leske+Budrich, pp. 335-372
Croissant, Aurel/Lauth, Hans-Joachim/Merkel, Wolfgang (2000), “Zivilgesellschaft und
Transformation: ein internationaler Vergleich“, in: Merkel, Wolfgang (ed.), Sys-
temwechsel 5. Zivilgesellschaft und Transformation, Opladen: Leske+Budrich, pp.
9-49
Edwards, Michael (2004), Civil Society, Cambridge: Polity Press
Englehart, Neil A. (2005), “Is Regime Change enough for Burma? The Problem of State
Capacity“, in: Asian Survey, Vol. XLV, No. 4, July/August, pp. 622-644
Civil Society 33
Fink, Christina (2001), Living Silence. Burma under Military Rule, Bangkok: White Lotus
Gosewinkel, Dieter (2003), Zivilgesellschaft – eine Erschließung des Themas von seinen Gren-
zen her, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), Discussion
Paper No. SP IV 2003-505
— (2005), “Civil Society – Developing the Topic from its Boundaries“, in: Heinrich Boell
Foundation (ed.) (2005), Towards Good Society? Civil Society Actors, the State, and the
Business Class in Southeast Asia – Facilitators of or Impediments to a Strong, Democratic,
and Fair Society?, Berlin, pp. 11-24
Gosewinkel, Dieter/Rucht, Dieter (2003), “History meets sociology: Zivilgesellschaft als
Prozess“, in: Gosewinkel, Dieter/Rucht, Dieter/van den Daele, Wolfgang/Kocka,
Jürgen (2003), Zivilgesellschaft national und transnational, Wissenschaftszentrum
Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Jahrbuch 2003, edition sigma, Berlin, pp. 29-60
Gosewinkel, Dieter/Rucht, Dieter/van den Daele, Wolfgang/Kocka, Jürgen (2003), “In-
troduction“, in: ibid (ed.) (2003), Zivilgesellschaft national und transnational, Wissen-
schaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) Jahrbuch 2003, edition sigma, Berlin,
pp. 11-26
Guan, Lee Hock (2004), “Introduction: Civil Society in Southeast Asia“, in: ibid. (ed.)
(2004), Civil Society in Southeast Asia, Singapore: NIAS Press, pp. 1-26
Heng, Russell Hian-Khng (2004), “Civil Society Effectiveness and the Vietnamese State –
Despite or Because of the Lack of Autonomy“, in: Lee Hock Guan (ed.) (2004), Civil
Society in Southeast Asia, Singapore: NIAS Press, pp. 144-166
Houtman, Gustaf (1999), Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics. Aung San Suu Kyi and
the National League for Democracy, ILCAA Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia
and Africa, Monograph Series No. 33, Tokyo
Howell, Jude (1999), Manufacturing Civil Society from the Outside: Some Dilemmas and
Challenges, paper presented at the European Association of Development Research
and Training Institutes (EADI) Conference in September
Htain Linn (2003), “Dead Set on Helping“, in: The Irrawaddy, Vol. 11. No. 10, December.
Online: http://www.irrawaddy.org/database/2003/vol11.10/culture/html (accessed
03.10.05)
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (ed.) (2004), “Birma“, in:
Jährliche Übersicht zur Verletzung von Gewerkschaftsrechten. Online: http://www.
icftu.org/survey2004.asp?language=DE (accessed 20.03.05)
International Crisis Group (ICG) (2001), Myanmar: The Role of Civil Society, Asia Report
No. 27, Bangkok/Brussels
34 Jasmin Lorch
— (2002a), Myanmar: The Politics of Humanitarian Aid, ICG Asia Report No. 32,
Bangkok/Brussels
— (2002b), Myanmar: The Future of the Armed Forces, ASIA Brieﬁng, Bangkok/ Brussels
— (2003), Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics, ICG Asia Report No. 52,
Bangkok/Brussels
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2001), Report No. 01/18, Myanmar Statistical Annex,
January 01. Online: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2001/cr0118.pdf
(accessed 20.03.05)
Internationales Konversionszentrum Bonn und Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und
Entwicklung (2005), Länderinformationen Myanmar. Online: http://www.
bicc.de/ruestungsexport/db_content.php?country=Myanmar&table1=yes (accessed
20.04.05)
Karetnikov, Dimitri (2004), “Figure 1.4. Collapsed, Failed, Failing and Weak States, 2003:
Region 4: Asia“, in: Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.) (2004), When States Fail. Causes and
Consequences, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 49
Lauth, Hans-Joachim (2003), “Zivilgesellschaft als Konzept und die Suche nach ihren
Akteuren“, in: Bauerkämper, Arnd (ed.) (2003), Die Praxis der Zivilgesellschaft.
Akteure, Handeln und Strukturen im internationalen Vergleich, Frankfurt/New York:
Campus Verlag, pp. 31-54
Liddell, Zunetta (1999), “No Room to Move: Legal Constraints on Civil Society in Burma“,
in: Burma Center Netherlands (BNC) and Transnational Institute (TNI) (ed.) (1999),
Strengthening Civil Society in Burma. Possibilities and Dilemmas for International
NGOs, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 54-68
Linz, Juan J. (2000), Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, Colorado: Lynne Rienners
Publishers Inc.
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) (2004), Deﬁnition of Civil Society.
Online: http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/introduction.htm (accessed 12.03.04)
May Oo (2004), Director of Communication of the Free Burma Coalition, Interview,
Washington D.C., 20 February
Metta website. Online: http://www.metta-myanmar.org (accessed 18.03.05)
Mutz, Gerd/Ouan, Nina (2004), Dokumentation des Fachgesprächs Globalisierung und
Zivilgesellschaften. Perspektiven des sozialen Wandels in Südostasien, staged by the
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Bonn
Mya Maung (1992), Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development, New
York: Paragon House
Civil Society 35
— (1998), The Burma Road to Capitalism. Economic Growth versus Democracy, Westport:
Praeger
Parker, Clive (2005), “Burma Struggling to Meet Millennium Development Goals“, in: The
Irrawaddy, 7. Sep. Online: http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=4958&z=153
(accessed 17.11.05)
Pedersen, Morten B./Rudland, Emily/May, Ronald J. (eds.) (2000), Burma Myanmar.
Strong Regime Weak State?, Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing
Perinova, Marie (2005), Civil Society in Authoritarian Regime. The Analysis of China,
Burma and Vietnam, ed. by LUND University Department of Political Science.
Online: http://theses.lub.lu.se/archive/2005/05/23/1116839547-15844-327/thesis_
of_Marie_Perinova.PDF (accessed 30.09.05)
Purcell, Marc (1999), “Ace-handles or Willing Minions?: International NGOs in Burma“,
in: Burma Center Netherlands (BNC) and Transnational Institute (TNI) (ed.) (1999),
Strengthening Civil Society in Burma. Possibilities and Dilemmas for International
NGOs, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 69-109
Rau, Zbigniew (ed.) (1991), The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, Boulder/San Francisco/Oxford: Westview Press
Risse, Thomas (2005), “Governance in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit. ’Failed states’
werden zum zentralen Problem der Weltpolitik“, in: Internationale Politik, September,
pp. 6-12
Rotberg, Robert I. (2004), “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and
Indicators“, in: ibid. (ed.) (2004), When States Fail. Causes and Consequences, Princeton:
Princeton University Press, pp. 1-25
Rudland, Emily/Pedersen, Morten B. (2000), “Introduction: Strong Regime, Weak State?“,
in: Pedersen, Morten B./Rudland, Emily/May, R.J. (eds.) (2000), Burma Myanmar.
Strong Regime Weak State?, Adelaide: Crawford House Publishing, pp. 1-21
Schneckener, Ulrich (2004), “States at Risk. Zur Analyse fragiler Staatlichkeit“, in: ibid.
(ed.), States at Risk. Fragile Staaten als Sicherheits- und Entwicklungsproblem, SWP
Studie S 43, Berlin
Seekins, Donald M. (2005), “Burma and US Sanctions. Punishing an Authoritarian Regime“,
in: Asian Survey, Vol. XLV, No. 3, May/June, pp. 437-452
Selth, Andrew (1995), “The Myanmar Army Since 1988: Acquisitions and Adjustments“,
in: Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 17, No. 3, Dec.
— (2001), Burma: A Strategic Perspective, Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 13
36 Jasmin Lorch
Seng Raw (2001), “Views from Myanmar. An Ethnic Minority Perspective“, in: Taylor,
Robert H. (ed.) (2001), Burma. Political Economy under Military Rule, London: Hurst
& Company, pp. 159-163
— (2004), “Message from the Programm Director“, in: Metta Annual Report 2004, p. 1.
Online: http://www.metta-myanmar.org/pdf_ﬁles/2004_Metta_Annual_Report.pdf
(accessed 18.03.2005)
Siemers, Günter (1993), “Das Militär in Myanmar – Politische Rolle und soziokulturelle
Voraussetzungen“, in: Dahm, Bernhard/Weyand, Rita (eds.) (1993), Das Militär in den
ASEAN-Staaten auf der Grundlage unterschiedlicher soziokultureller Voraussetzungen,
Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde No. 216, pp. 62-97
Smith, Martin (1999), “Ethnic Conﬂict and the Challenge of Civil Society in Burma“, in:
Burma Center Netherlands (BNC) and Transnational Institute (TNI) (ed.) (1999),
Strengthening Civil Society in Burma. Possibilities and Dilemmas for International
NGOs, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 15-53
— (2002), Burma (Myanmar): The time for Change, ed. by Minority Rights Group Inter-
national. Online: http://www.minorityrights.org/admin/Download/Pdf/Burma%
20Report.pdf (accessed 01.12.05)
South, Ashley (2003), Roadmaps and Political Transition in Burma: The Need for Two-Way
Trafﬁc. This text was the basis of Ashley South’s presentation at the “Burma Day 2003:
Political and humanitarian options for the international community“ Conference
in Brussels, 08.10.03. A slightly abridged version appeared in two parts, in: The
Irrawaddy Online, 16-17 October. Online: http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs/Ashley-
South_Political_Transition.htm (accessed 01.10.05)
— (2004), “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization“, in:
Contemporary Southeast Asia. A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol. 26,
No. 2, pp. 233-255
Steinberg, David I. (1999), “A Void in Myanmar: Civil Society in Burma“, in: Burma Center
Netherlands (BNC) and Transnational Institute (TNI) (ed.) (1999), Strengthening
Civil Society in Burma. Possibilities and Dilemmas for International NGOs, Chiang
Mai: Silkworm Books, pp. 1-14
— (2000), “The State, Power and Civil Society in Burma-Myanmar: The Status and
Prospects for Pluralism“, in: Pedersen, Morten B./Rudland, Emily/May, Ronald J.
(eds.) (2000), Burma Myanmar. Strong Regime Weak State?, Adelaide: Crawford House
Publishing, pp. 91-122
— (2001a), “The Burmese Conundrum. Approaching reformation of the political
economy“, in: Taylor, Robert H. (ed.) (2001), Burma. Political Economy under
Military Rule, London: Hurst & Company, pp. 41-69
Civil Society 37
— (2001b), Burma. The State of Myanmar, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University
Press
UNAIDS (2004), Epidemiological Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infec-
tions: Myanmar, Update
Will, Gerhard (2004), Case Study Burma, Discussion Paper for Third Europe-Southeast
Asia Forum Southeast Asian Security: Challenges and Structures A Conference
Jointly Organised by Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Centre for Strategic
and International Studies, Jakarta, Federal Ministry of Defence, Berlin Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, 13-15 December. Online: http://www.swp-berlin.
org/common/get_document.php?id=1160 (accessed 16.11.05)
Wischermann, Jörg (2005), “Towards Good Society? Civil Society Actors, the State, and
the Business Class in Southeast Asia – Facilitators of or Impediments to a Strong,
Democratic, and Fair Society? Conceptual Reﬂections“, in: Heinrich Boell Founda-
tion (ed.) (2005), Towards Good Society? Civil Society Actors, the State, and the Business
Class in Southeast Asia – Facilitators of or Impediments to a Strong, Democratic, and Fair
Society?, Berlin, pp. 201-252
Yang, Da-hua David (2004), “Civil Society as an Analytic Lens for Contemporary China“,
in: China: An International Journal, Vol. 2, Nr. 1 (March), pp. 1-27
Zürcher, Christoph (2005), “Gewollte Schwäche. Vom schwierigen analytischen Umgang
mit prekärer Staatlichkeit“, in: Internationale Politik, September, pp. 13-22
The author wishes to thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive and
thought-provoking comments and their extremely helpful suggestions.
